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INTRODUCTION
On May 17, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Saenz v. Roe.1
Superficially, the case appears to have broken no new ground other
than as a belated attempt to revive the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment2 in the context of the right to
travel.3  Upon closer examination, however, we glean a more subtle
development:  the Supreme Court’s attempt at closure to one of the
                                                 
* Associate, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans, P.L.L.C., Washington,
D.C. The author recently completed a clerkship with Judge Stephen F. Williams, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; J.D., Yale Law School, 1998.
1. 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States . . . .”).
3. See Thomas E. Baker, Traveling Back in Time:  Privileges and Immunities Clause
Unearthed to Strike Down State Welfare Law, LEGAL TIMES, July 12, 1999, at S24 (stating
that the Saenz Court “revived the privileges and immunities clause after 130 years of
judicial desuetude”).
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modern constitutional sagas—a constitutional home for the so-called
“right to travel.”  Over the past fifty years, the Court has canvassed the
bailiwick of constitutional law in search of a meaningful
underpinning for the right to travel.  When an oblique, non-textual
doctrine based upon the general notion of political unity fizzled,4 the
Court sought refuge under due process5 or equal protection analysis.6
In addition to, or in spite of, these two vastly different
jurisprudential doctrines, the Court has suggested that the right to
travel could be traced to a concept of national citizenship,
independent of the Fourteenth Amendment,7 the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV (The “Comity Clause”),8 the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,9
and the Commerce Clause.10  The right to travel—the ubiquitous
right in search of a sure constitutional footing—has found a new
home in a long-dormant clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Despite its insecure origins, the right to travel never has been
questioned seriously.11  Its implications may have been debated, but
the right almost always has been taken for granted.  Unlike abortion
or other due process privacy right issues, there appears to be no
important political group that has campaigned for or against this
                                                 
4. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 41 (1867) (declining to uphold
the constitutionality of a state-levied tax on interstate travelers because doing so
would be inconsistent with the rights belonging to citizens of other states).
5. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits Congress from denying public assistance to
poor persons otherwise eligible solely on the ground that they have not been
residents of [a state] for one year at the time their applications are filed.”).
6. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1982) (holding that a state dividend
plan that shares state funds with its citizens based on minimum residency violates the
Equal Protection Clause).
7. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643 (Stewart, J., concurring) (asserting that the right
to travel is constitutionally protected independent of the Fourteenth Amendment).
8. See id. at 630 n.8 (noting that in other cases from the latter half of the
nineteenth century, the right to travel was based on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871) (stating
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects the right of a citizen of one state
to travel into another state in order to engage in commerce, trade, or business); Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) (holding that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause provides “the right of free ingress into other states, and egress
from them”).
9. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629 (noting that the Court has long recognized that
Americans are free to travel uninhibited by rules or regulations); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause protects the “right to move freely from State to
State”).
10. See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 172 (stating that the transportation of persons is
“commerce” within the meaning of the Commerce Clause).
11. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966) (observing that although
there is no consensus as to the right’s source, there is consensus as to the existence of
the right).
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widely embraced “right.”  The irony, however, in the popular
capitulation to this new “right” is that although the discussion of
interstate travel and migration always has been mired in the language
of personal rights and discrimination, the policy rationale for the
“right” usually has been put forth as a means of promoting the
federal union.  How then did a rights-based perspective of
constitutional theory come to supplant the federalist origins of the
limitations of states to restrict interstate travel?
This Article attempts to dispel the notion that the limitation on a
state’s power to restrict interstate travel and migration is based upon
a notion of a personal right to travel.  Instead, this limitation, like the
dormant Commerce Clause,12 is traceable to an idea of conserving the
political and economic union against provincial state interests.
Viewed from this perspective, the constitutional value that protects
free interstate movement is one grounded purely in our federalist
structure and is not traceable to the spirit of specific provisions in the
Bill of Rights.13  As set forth below, the original cases that explored
the limitation on state power implicitly endorsed such a restrictive
notion of free interstate movement.  The early introduction of
individual “rights” terminology, however, hampered its development
as a doctrine.  Indeed, subsequent decisions continue to recognize
that the policy basis of the right is encapsulated in a federalist
promotion norm.
Interestingly, as the modern right to travel has evolved, it rarely has
done so as a stand-alone right, and it is most often used to buttress
other constitutional interests or rights.14  Stripped of those other
constitutional interests, there hardly seems to be any special
solicitude for personal protection against state power embodied in a
“right to travel.”  Instead of a right to travel, a more apt description of
this constitutional principle would be a “free movement doctrine.”
This phrase properly captures the essence of the principle as one that
promotes the political and economic union by limiting interstate
conflict, and not as the fountain of an individual right to travel.
                                                 
12. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
13. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
14. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259-60 (1974)
(addressing the right to medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-41
(1972) (describing the right to vote); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629 (tying the right to
travel to welfare benefits).
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE OF LIMITATIONS BASED ON
FEDERALIST PRINCIPLES
A. The Comity and Commerce Clauses
Not all limitations on state power, even those embodying anti-
discrimination principles, are based on individual rights.  Some
limitations, such as the dormant Commerce Clause and the Comity
Clause, limit the powers of states against other states or against the
federal government in order to promote a political, social, and
economic union.15  To understand whether an anti-discrimination
principle is properly an issue of interstate unity rather than of
individual rights,16 one must look to its underlying political theory.
Hamilton described the core political value of the Comity Clause as
“the basis of the union,”17 which suggests that the goal of the Comity
Clause was to reduce interstate conflict.  The Commerce Clause
purportedly intended to limit conflict among the states on issues of
trade.18  Both clauses have historical origins traceable to the Articles
of Confederation, which were drafted at a time when the Framers’
main objective seemed to be the promotion of commercial relations
among the states, not the protection of individual rights.19
It is no coincidence that the modern “right to travel” also has been
                                                 
15. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 526-28 (1935) (finding that a
state may not impose sanctions that burden interstate commerce).  The restriction of
state power to prevent burdening interstate commerce, however, does not stem from
any explicit language in the Constitution.  See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949) (indicating that although the Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate commerce, it does not say what states may or may not
do in the absence of congressional action).
16. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 43, 46 (1988) (stating that the concern of the Framers regarding an economic
union among the states “arose from conflicts among the states . . . , not from disputes
between the states and individual merchants”).  Collins uses the phrase
“intergovernmental rights” to describe those limitations on state power intended
primarily to limit interstate conflicts.  See id.
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
18. In New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988), the Court characterized
the standard for violating the Commerce Clause:  “[S]tate statutes that clearly
discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck down, unless the
discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism.”  Id. at 274 (citations omitted); see also Collins, supra note 16, at 45
(claiming that economic union was a principal aim of the Framers).
19. See Jonathan D. Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 487, 487-89 (1981) (stating that Article IV of the Articles of Confederation
“declared the principle that each state generally must treat the residents of sister
states as it would treat its own”); see also Collins, supra note 16, at 52-55
(acknowledging that the emphasis in the Articles of Confederation on commercial
unity among the states was carried over to the Constitution).
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traced to the same provision in the Articles of Confederation.20
Subsequent originalist interpretations by members of the Court
justify the interpretation that, in enacting these clauses, the Founding
Fathers targeted discriminatory policies driven by state parochialism.21
In clarifying the purpose of the Commerce Clause, for example,
Justice Jackson observed that after the Revolutionary War:
[A] drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states
began.  “[E]ach State would legislate according to its estimate of its
own interests, the importance of its own products, and the local
advantages or disadvantages of its position in a political or
commercial view.”  This came “to threaten at once the peace and
safety of the Union.”22
Fifteen years prior to Justice Jackson’s comments, Justice Cardozo
expressed similar sentiments in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.23 in which
he stated that “a chief occasion of the commerce clause was ‘the
mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in
customs barriers and other economic retaliation.’”24  In the same
case, Justice Cardozo noted that the Constitution “was framed upon
the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together.”25  The propriety of the Court’s usage of the dormant
Commerce Clause to strike down state legislation that discriminates
against commerce has had its share of controversy.26  None of these
commentators, however, seem to dispute that the animating principle
behind the Commerce Clause is to secure the cohesion of the union.
In analyzing the purpose of the Comity Clause in Baldwin v. Fish &
                                                 
20. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (describing the origins of the
free movement principle).
21. For other commentary on some of the Founding Fathers’ sentiments at the
time of the Constitutional Convention, see M. FARRAND, THE FATHERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 96-208 (1921) (observing that tensions and conflicts among the states
disrupted commerce); JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 217-25 (1966) (discussing the dangers of establishing a
government that allows too much state power over other states).
22. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (quoting J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 259, 260
(1833)).
23. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
24. Id. at 522.
25. Id. at 523.
26. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
“the Court for over a century has engaged in an enterprise that it has been unable to
justify”); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 690 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The Commerce Clause is, after all, a grant of authority
to Congress, not to the courts.”); J. THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2090-91
(1895); see also Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425, 428 (1982) (proposing a “radically diminished role for both the dormant
commerce clause and the Court as its interpreter”).
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Game Commission,27 Justice Blackmun held that certain distinctions
made by a state between residents and non-residents “are prohibited
because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development
of a single Union of those States.”28  More than one hundred years
prior to Justice Blackmun’s statement, Justice Field recognized that
the Comity Clause’s primary goal was “to place the citizens of each
State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the
advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are
concerned.”29  By understanding the clause as no more than a union-
promoting value that limits the power of states to discriminate against
other states, we escape the temptation to improperly classify any anti-
discrimination value as an individual right.
As a constitutional norm antecedent to the Bill of Rights, the values
embraced by both the Commerce and the Comity Clauses are distinct
from those embraced in the Bill of Rights.  Judging from the
Supreme Court’s pronouncement on the issue, the “norm of comity”
value in the Privilege and Immunities Clause simply displaces any
idea that the clause is a source of “natural rights.”30  Indeed, to
suggest that the clause itself is a fountain of federal rights would
render the clause redundant.31  Federal rights can be enforced
directly against the states under the Supremacy Clause32 and the
incorporation principle embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment.33
As Justice Blackmun held in Baldwin, it is only those interests or
activities that are “basic to the maintenance and well-being of the
Union” that are triggered under the anti-discrimination principle of
the Comity Clause.34
                                                 
27. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
28. Id. at 383.
29. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
30. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 382 (stating that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
“establishes a norm of comity without specifying the particular subjects as to which
citizens of one State coming within the jurisdiction of another are guaranteed
equality of treatment”) (quoting Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-61
(1975)).
31. See Varat, supra note 19, at 513 (arguing that if the Supreme Court took a
“fundamental equal protection interest” to trigger the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the clause would become superfluous).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (declaring that state judges must hold U.S. laws
above conflicting state laws).
33. As Professor Varat makes clear, the fundamental rights and interests
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment clearly are narrower than the interests
protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  See Varat, supra note 19, at
513-14 (stating that the standard used to interpret the application of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause “is not as rigid as that applicable to classifications impinging
on equal protection fundamental interests”).
34. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388 (holding that a state’s right to impose higher fees
on non-residents for an activity that is not a fundamental right is constitutional).
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B. The Free Movement Principle
Although the Comity Clause is not coextensive with the Commerce
Clause,35 there is a special kinship between the two clauses that “stems
from their common origin in the Fourth Article of the Articles of
Confederation and their shared vision of federalism.”36  As previously
mentioned, both clauses share a common objective of promoting the
union of “a single nation—one and the same people.”37  The free
movement principle—the freedom “to travel throughout the length
and breadth of our land”38—also shares a common heritage with
these other two clauses.  It, too, is mentioned expressly in the Fourth
Article of the Articles of Confederation.39  In adapting language from
the Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation into the
Constitution’s Comity Clause, however, the drafters omitted language
relating to interstate travel and the privileges of trade.40  Even in the
abbreviated version adopted in the Constitution, the relevance was
clear:  “the provision was carried over into the comity article of the
Constitution in briefer form but with no change of substance or
intent, unless it was to strengthen the force of the Clause in
fashioning a single nation.”41  In Crandall v. Nevada,42 the Court
concluded that the principle of free interstate movement was
                                                 
35. The Privileges and Immunities Clause “was designed to insure to a citizen of
State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B
enjoy.”  Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).  The main objects of the
dormant Commerce Clause, however, are “statutes that discriminate against
interstate commerce.”  See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87
(1987).  Justice Field concluded that corporations were not citizens for purposes of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 178
(1868), but the Court permits corporations to bring challenges to discriminatory
state laws under the Commerce Clause.  See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enter., 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988) (holding that if a state denies “like privileges to out-
of-state persons or corporations engaged in commerce,” the state law is reviewed
under the Commerce Clause).  Not all commentators embrace this distinction of the
scope covered by the two clauses.  Professor Eule argues that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause alone can counter the constitutional problems with commercial
isolationism, and that the “legal underpinnings” of the Commerce Clause are “no
longer sound.”  Eule, supra note 26, at 451.
36. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978) (citations omitted).
37. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596 (1923).
38. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 608, 629 (1969).
39. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1777) (ensuring the right of people
to travel freely from one state to another “to secure and perpetuate mutual
friendship . . . among the people of the different states”).
40. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
41. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975).  Charles Pinckney, one
of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, also claimed that the Comity
Clause was “formed exactly upon the same principles of the 4th article of the present
Confederation.”  3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 112 (M.
Farrand ed., 1911).
42. 73 U.S. 35 (6 Wall.) (1867).
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predicated on the notion that “we are all citizens of the United States,
and as members of the same community must have the right to pass
and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as
in our own States.”43  In United States v. Guest,44 Justice Stewart
expanded upon the union-promoting norm in Crandall by asserting
that the freedom to move interstate “occupies a position fundamental
to the concept of our Federal Union . . . .  [The] right finds no
explicit mention in the Constitution.  The reason, it has been
suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the
beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the
Constitution created.”45
Interestingly, the common heritage and policy norm shared by the
free movement principle with the Comity and Commerce Clauses
often led the Court to trace the source of a “right to travel” to these
two clauses.46  That the Comity Clause may be the basis of the free
movement principle seems uncontroversial, especially if a state erects
actual barriers to travel to or within the state by non-residents.47  This
theory, however, only holds water if one of the privileges and
immunities protected includes the freedom to travel.48  Alternatively,
                                                 
43. Id. at 49.
44. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
45. Id. at 757-58 (emphasis added).
46. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969) (noting that the
Court has used both the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause
to guarantee the right to interstate travel), overruled in part on other grounds by
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
172-73 (1941) (using the Commerce Clause to invalidate a California law that
impeded the free interstate movement of an indigent).  In Edwards, the Court opined
that transportation of a person was commerce and thus subject to the Commerce
Clause.  See id. at 172.  Expounding broadly on union-promoting values, Justice Byrne
held that California could not isolate itself from the difficulties common to all states
“by restraining the transportation of persons and property across its borders.”  Id. at
173.
47. In this context, the state clearly would be discriminating between residents
and non-residents—an activity generally at odds with the Commerce Clause.  See
Baldwin v. Fish & Gaming Comm’n, 437 U.S. 371, 483 (1978).
48. In the early case of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No.
3,320), Justice Washington stated that some of the privileges protected by the clause
included “[t]he right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any
other state.”  Id. at 552.  Justice Douglas, however, called into question the notion
that the Article IV clause had enough muster to protect a “right to travel” when he
stated in Edwards that the Privileges and Immunities Clause “is primarily concerned
with the incidents of citizenship . . . so that a citizen of one State is not in a condition
of alienage when he is within or when he removes to another state.”  314 U.S. at 180
(Douglas, J., concurring) (internal quotes omitted).  Moreover, Justice Douglas
argued that the Privileges and Immunities Clause could not explain the Crandall
decision because “[t]he statute in that case applied to citizens of Nevada as well as to
citizens of other States.  That is to say Nevada was not discriminating against citizens
of other states in favor of its own.”  Id. at 180-81 (Douglas, J., concurring) (internal
quotes omitted).  Justice Douglas’ opinion embraces the idea that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause is a non-discriminating norm limiting the states and not a
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the Comity Clause may protect the free movement principle
indirectly because a non-resident denied travel by a host state may
also be denied other privileges and immunities protected by that
clause.49
If the “right” or norm is asserted, however, by a resident who
believes that he or she is being treated unfairly because of some
durational residency requirement, the clause does not afford
significant relief because its constitutional protection does not extend
to residents.50  It is in this latter context—where the newly arrived
resident seeks to be treated on equal footing with long-term
residents—that a more expansive norm of free movement beyond the
Comity Clause becomes necessary.  Furthermore, it is this particular
understanding on which this Article attempts to shed some light.
Leaving aside for a moment the question of textual sources for a
“right to travel,” the freedom-to-move principle, the Commerce
Clause, and the Comity Clause constitute a “trio” of union-conserving
norms.  The union-conserving norm should govern how we analyze
the scope of constitutional restrictions.  Assuming, as Justice Brennan
argued, that efforts to assign the principle of free movement some
textual source in the Constitution are “both inconclusive and
unnecessary,”51 how do we define coherent parameters for this
principle?  This Article proffers that we look to the union-promoting
norm for the necessary guidance.
II. THE SCOPE OF FEDERALIST LIMITATIONS
It seems that every anti-discriminatory, union-promoting principle
embedded in the Constitution has been cast at one time as a personal
or individual right.  Prior to the New Deal Era, the Supreme Court
declared that the right to carry on interstate commerce was “a right
which every citizen is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and
laws of the United States.”52  Similarly, early slaveholders professed a
fundamental right under the Comity Clause to move their slave
                                                 
separate source of substantive rights.
49. See David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 794, 836 (1987) (arguing that because a citizen is given certain rights in
another state by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, any restriction on travel would
deny the citizen those rights).
50. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (noting that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause guarantees that the citizen of one state who enters into
another state has the same privileges as citizens of that other state).
51. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
52. See Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891) (finding that interstate
commerce is not a right granted by a state and therefore, cannot be taken away by a
state).
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property through non-slaveholding territory.53  The idea that Article
IV could be an independent source of fundamental rights, however,
was dispensed with early.  For example, in the Slaughterhouse Cases,54
the Court confined its scope to anti-discriminatory, union-promoting
principles when it proclaimed that:
[the clause] did not create those rights, which it called privileges
and immunities of the citizens of the States . . . .  Its sole purpose
was to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as
you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or
qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither
more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other
States within your jurisdiction.55
Likewise, in Corfield v. Coryell,56 Circuit Justice Washington
attempted to imbue the Article IV clause with a norm of substantive
rights that citizens of all states would enjoy.57  The Supreme Court in
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission58 later rejected that classification,
thereby making clear that the relevant standard tested whether a state
disadvantaged residents relative to non-residents.59  In Baldwin, the
Court held that the clause protected a specific interest if such interest
was “fundamental,” that is, if the interest had any “bearing upon the
vitality of the Nation as a single entity.”60  The Court then ruled that
the interest at issue, elk hunting, was not such a fundamental
interest.61
                                                 
53. See Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860) (rejecting a slaveholder’s claim
that the state did not give him his entitled privileges and immunities, as he was given
all the rights of a New York citizen).
54. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 75 (1873).
55. Id. at 77.
56. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,320).
57. In Justice Washington’s view:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states?  We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at
all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and
sovereign.  What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more
tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all
comprehended under the following general heads:  Protection by the
government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole.
Id. at 551-52.
58. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
59. See id. at 381-83 (noting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is meant to
prevent one state from burdening citizens of another state).
60. Id. at 383.
61. See id. at 388 (“Equality in access to Montana Elk is not basic to the
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Although commentators have criticized the Court’s delimitation of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause’s protection to fundamental
interests,62 the Court’s focus on the underlying norms protected by
the clause has remained consistent—non-discrimination and union-
promotion.  Similarly, nothing in the clause is particularly solicitous
to individual rights.  For example, one commentator has argued that
the history of the drafting of the clause militates against any such
notion that it is the source of fundamental rights common to all.63  As
such, the Comity Clause’s normative vision is federalism, not
individualism.64
The types of interests protected by the Comity Clause vary from
obtaining a job and acquiring property to equality in taxation.65  In
each case, the Court has been careful to scrutinize the relevant
interest based upon its relative significance on the cohesiveness of a
national union of several states.66  On the other hand, fundamental
individual rights—those rights under the Equal Protection Clause
that are implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution—
require no such analysis.67  Finally, the liberty to pursue a common
calling, which is an interest the Court has labeled “one of the most
fundamental of those privileges protected by the [Article IV]
                                                 
maintenance or well-being of the Union . . . .  Whatever rights or activities may be
‘fundamental’ under the Privileges and Immunities Clause[,] elk hunting by non-
residents in Montana is not one of them.”).
62. See Gary J. Simson, Discrimination against Nonresidents and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 385 (1979) (describing the
highly speculative nature of “the relationship between the fundamental or
nonfundamental character of a privilege or immunity and the amount of interstate
friction generated by its selective denial to non-residents”); Varat, supra note 19, at
515 (stating that the result of the Court’s approach is “to denigrate the constitutional
concern with the use of state residence as a basis for classification and to shift the
focus to the fundamentality of the activity in dispute”).
63. See Bogen, supra note 49, at 843 (arguing that the privileges and immunities
contained in the clause were to be those rights separately granted by each state).
64. See John M. Gonzales, Comment, The Interstate Privileges and Immunities:
Fundamental Rights or Federalism?, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 493, 499 (1986) (explaining that
a state may not create obstacles to federalism).
65. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 217-23 (1984) (finding non-residents’ interests in employment in a state to be
fundamental); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 246-55 (1898) (holding that an out-
of-state creditor of a corporation must be afforded the same entitlements as an in-
state creditor); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430-32 (1871) (finding that
a state may not discriminate by imposing higher taxes on non-residents of the state).
66. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1985)
(determining that the right to practice law comes within the Privileges and
Immunities Clause because the practice of law is important to the national
economy).
67. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-59 (1973)
(finding no violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the state’s system had a
rational connection to a legitimate state purpose).
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Clause,”68 was rejected as a fundamental individual right under equal
protection analysis.69
In the Commerce Clause context, the “individual rights” approach
has been less of an issue, although it has had its adherents.70  One
commentator has exposed the flaws in the logic of such esoteric
theories,71 and this Article is not the appropriate forum in which to
embark on a critique of the political process theory of individual
rights.  Even those who subscribe to the political process theory
acknowledge, however, that the Commerce Clause is an equality-
based, and not a substantive, limitation.72  In other words, the
Commerce Clause only would prohibit unequal treatment under
state law, but would not look to the substance of the law’s contents.73
The proper scope of the Commerce Clause was one issue in
Edwards v. California.74  In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that a
California statute that made it a misdemeanor to bring, or assist in
bringing, into the state any indigent non-resident imposed an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.75  In their
concurrences, Justices Douglas and Jackson insisted that, irrespective
of the statute’s violation of interstate commerce principles, the
statute violated a fundamental right—the right to travel—which the
Justices located in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.76  Justice Douglas was concerned that the
majority decided the case under Commerce Clause principles when
the issues actually involved a “right [that] occupies a more protected
position in our constitutional system than does the movement of
cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.”77  Justice Jackson
similarly opined that “[t]o hold that the measure of [a human
                                                 
68. United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 219 (explaining that most cases involving the
Privileges and Immunities Clause deal with a fundamental activity).
69. See id. (stating that the right to government employment is not fundamental).
70. See Collins, supra note 16, at 45 n.18 (discussing process-based theory of
constitutional law).
71. See id. at 110-16 (criticizing various arguments that apply personal rights of
non-residents under political process theory to Commerce Clause).
72. See Eule, supra note 26, at 448 (noting that there is no reason that litigation
under the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause ought not to
be played out on an equality-oriented stage).
73. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L.J. 1385, 1387-88 (distinguishing substantive and equality-based constitutional
limitations).
74. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
75. See id. at 174 (finding that a state may not prohibit the transportation of
indigents across its borders).
76. See id. at 177-85 (Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining that the right to move
freely is fundamentally protected from a state’s interference).
77. Id. at 177-78 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that the right to travel between
two states was protected as the right of “national citizenship”).
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being’s] rights is the commerce clause is likely to result eventually
either in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human
rights.”78  Even though the Justices’ views about the relative statures of
individual rights versus federalist interests may be debatable, their
separate analyses, that there is a distinction between the two
principles, seems unimpeachable.  Ironically, although both Justices
were willing to distinguish the sorts of protection conferred by the
Comity Clause and the Commerce Clause from fundamental
individual rights,79 they lumped the free movement principle into the
latter category.80
The free movement principle, as noted previously, has its origins in
the same Article of Confederation as the Commerce and Comity
Clauses.81  As such, the Comity Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the
free movement principle share a common normative goal:  to protect
and promote the cohesiveness of the federal union.  After the textual
reference to the free movement principle was omitted from the final
version of the Constitution, however, the courts somehow had to
fashion this protection from scratch.  In addition, without referring
to any real historical support regarding its origins, the modern
Supreme Court has surmised unambivalently that the right to travel
always has been recognized and protected.82  Strangely enough, in its
modern incarnation, this unwritten principle has managed to draw
on a more expansive constitutional norm than its written
counterparts—the Commerce and Comity Clauses.  Instead of a
union-promoting principle of federalist origins, it is now cast as a
fundamental right.  Nevertheless, the Court has continued to label
the norm protected by this right as a union-conserving principle.83
The battle over the constitutional interests embraced by the “right
to travel” came to the fore in Zobel v. Williams.84  The Zobel Court held
that Alaska’s income distribution plan that favored long-term
residents over recent ones failed to qualify as a legitimate state
                                                 
78. Id. at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring).
79. See id. at 178-80 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that the right to travel was
protected before the Fourteenth Amendment was passed because it is a fundamental
right that is implied as a national right).
80. See id. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that a historical perspective
shows that one’s national citizenship grants the right of freedom of movement).
81. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
82. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (stating that “the right to
travel was grounded upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause”) (citing United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).
83. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (observing that the
federalist structure makes the “government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry”).
84. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
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purpose under the minimal rational standards of the Equal
Protection Clause.85  There was a split, however, among the Justices as
to whether the right to travel was a relevant inquiry and what norm
the right was protecting.  Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, referred to the analysis applied under the right in a
footnote as “little more than a particular application of equal
protection analysis.”86  The Chief Justice’s cavalier dismissal of
reliance on any “right to travel” analysis reveals the Burger Court’s
discomfort with a constitutional principle imbued with uncertain
applications and an incoherent scope.87  In a separate concurrence,
Justice Brennan, after acknowledging the federalist promotion norm
underlying the right to travel, delved into an analysis of the
illegitimacy of state purposes in passing durational-residency laws.88
Such illegitimacy, he concluded, was subject to a different analysis
from the “right to travel” and had a heritage that “reflects not the
structure of the Federal Union but the idea of constitutionally
protected equality.”89  Therefore, whatever Justice Brennan’s
objections to the majority’s opinion were, clearly he thought that the
right to travel was a liberty interest derived from our federalist
structure.
Similarly, of interest in Zobel was Justice O’Connor’s separate
concurring opinion stating that the “right to travel” ought to be
measured against “the principles implementing the privileges and
immunities clause [of Article IV].”90  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
was rich in historical detail about both the origin and scope of the
Comity Clause and the right to travel.91  O’Connor’s quest to ground
the right to travel in its historical context acknowledges that its
proper boundaries ought to be provided by its union-conserving
norms.  In limiting the scope of the free movement principle to the
Comity Clause, however, Justice O’Connor’s analysis may have been
                                                 
85. See id. at 64-65 (finding that there is no legitimate state interest if a state
divides its citizens into classes when determining benefits).
86. Id. at 60 n.6.
87. See id. (describing the nature and the source of the right to travel as
“obscure” and noting that “[i]n reality, right to travel analysis refers to little more
than a particular application of equal protection analysis”).
88. See id. at 66-68 (Brennan, J., concurring) (determining that although Alaska’s
statute threatens interstate travel and, thus, violates the Commerce Clause, the right
to travel is established more fully under the guise of equal protection).
89. See id. at 68 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the Constitution places all
citizens on level ground, regardless of the individual citizen’s length of residency).
90. Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
91. See id. at 78-81 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that although the Framers
omitted the freedom of “egress and ingress,” they maintained that freedom in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause).
1999] FREE MOVEMENT:  A FEDERALIST REINTERPRETATION 447
too restrictive.  As mentioned earlier, in the context of durational
residency requirements, Article IV’s limitations are inapplicable.92
Justice O’Connor attempted to deal with this problem by merging the
non-resident and new resident classifications.93  An interpretation,
however, that holds that the Comity Clause also requires the state to
treat all of its citizens equally conflates equality-based limitations with
substantive ones.  For, if the measure of equality is based on how the
state treats its own citizens versus outsiders, such a measure collapses
when the state treats its own citizens unequally.  Likewise, if the
premise is that some interests are so fundamental that the state may
not even deprive its own citizens of them, then it is the same as
stating that the Comity Clause imposes substantive limitations on the
states.  In any event, to avoid this jurisprudential difficulty all that
may be required is to suggest that, in addition to the equality-based
limitations of the Comity Clause, there are separate limitations
inherent in a distinct free movement principle that shares a common
heritage with the Comity Clause.
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Zobel, although agreeing
with the majority’s rational basis analysis, expounded on the
federalist norms associated with the right to travel.94  Alaska’s rent
division scheme would be invalid even prospectively, Brennan
reasoned, because of its inconsistency with the structure of our
federal union.95  For if each state were to indulge in such a scheme to
award its citizens on the basis of residency, then “the mobility so
essential to the economic progress of our Nation . . . would not long
survive.”96  Despite Justice Brennan’s description of the constitutional
policy underpinnings of the right to travel in such strong federalist
terms, he nevertheless accepted, without qualification, the Shapiro
language of fundamental rights without any analysis of how a purely
federalist restriction could translate into such a right.97
                                                 
92. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
93. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  O’Connor states that:
Each group of citizens who migrated to Alaska in the past, or chooses to
move there in the future, lives in the State on less favorable terms than those
who arrived earlier.  The circumstance that some of the disfavored citizens
already live in Alaska does not negate the fact that ‘the citizen of state A who
ventures in [Alaska]’ to establish a home labors under a continuous
disability.
Id. (citation omitted).
94. See id. at 66-68 (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing that states may engage
in limited forms of healthy rivalry for purposes of attracting citizenry).
95. See id. at 68 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that “the acknowledged
illegitimacy of [the] state purpose has a different heritage—it reflects not the
structure of the federal union but the idea of constitutional equality”).
96. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. See id. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring) (accepting that the “principle of free
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In subsequent cases, the Court has invoked the federalist
underpinnings of this non-discriminatory principle, although it
continues to confound this principle with the language of rights.  In
Gregory v. Ashcroft,98 the Court held that one of the benefits of our
federalist structure included “mak[ing] government more responsive
by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”99  In
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez,100 the plurality regarded the
right as one that could be “inferred from the federal structure of our
Constitution.”101  In addition, in Saenz v. Roe,102 the Court alluded to
strong federalist principles in grounding the right to travel in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.103
The Court’s most explicit federalist pronouncement of the free
movement principle, however, may be found in Bray v. Alexandria
Women’s Health Clinic.104
In Bray, certain abortion clinic and abortion rights organizations
applied for an injunction against anti-abortion protesters, claiming,
inter alia, that the protesters’ demonstration violated the interstate
travel rights of women seeking access to the clinic.105  In response, the
Court briefly summarized the two sets of burdens that the right
protected:  “the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement”
and “‘being treated differently’ from intrastate travelers.”106  After
observing that the only restriction of movement would have been in
the vicinity of the clinic and hence, purely intrastate, Justice Scalia
concluded that such a restriction would not “implicate the right to
interstate travel, even if applied intentionally against travelers from
other states, unless it is applied discriminatorily against them.”107  In
                                                 
interstate migration” is fundamental).
98. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
99. Id. at 458.  The Court also enumerated three other advantages of the
federalist structure, stating that such a structure “assures a decentralized government
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; [and] it allows
for more innovation and experimentation in government.”  Id.
100. 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (plurality opinion).
101. See id. at 902 (stating that the textual source of the right to travel is found in
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Commerce Clause, and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
102. 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
103. See id. at 1527 n.17 (linking the right to travel with the federalism that the
Framers crafted by “split[ting] the atom of sovereignty” and creating a government
in which “our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal,
each protected from incursion by the other”) (quoting United States Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
104. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
105. See id. at 266-67.
106. See id. at 277 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982)).
107. Id.
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this terse but sweeping statement, Justice Scalia dispensed with the
idea that the right was a substantive norm capable of being invoked
on its own terms.108  In treating the right to travel as an equality-based
restriction, the Bray Court implicitly rooted the right in the same
framework as the Comity Clause and, in so doing, de-linked the right
from the analysis applicable to other conventional rights.  In other
words, there was no right to travel as such; there was only a non-
discriminatory principle that the travel opportunities of insiders and
outsiders be treated equally.109  Unfortunately, despite the holding in
Bray, the Court’s right to travel jurisprudence tottered along its
confusing path.
Trying to distinguish an individual right and a non-discriminatory
principle designed to foster federalist values may seem like a hair-
splitting exercise.  After all, both are broad restrictions against state
power usually vindicated in courts by individuals.110  This may be in
part why the Court has found it unnecessary to develop a
constitutional typology to distinguish these principles.  In practice,
however, these distinct constitutional norms can have different
consequences even if vindicated in a similar manner.  The Court
could have elucidated such alternative consequences in at least three
different ways.
First, the Court may properly decide whether a non-discriminatory
principle is violated only after it has adequately considered the
constitutional value being protected by the principle.  For example, a
court may find that although a state has violated some non-
discriminatory principle stemming from our federal structure, the
context of the violation and the nature of the interest may dictate
against finding a constitutional “violation” because there may be no
threat to the underlying norm of promoting federalism, which is the
norm that the principle is trying to protect.111  As mentioned earlier,
                                                 
108. See id.
109. See id. (finding that the interstate travel right does not arise for out-of-state
travelers faced with an intrastate restriction unless the restriction is applied
discriminatorily against them).
110. In some contexts, states may sue directly to vindicate the values embraced by
these principles.  See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978)
(holding that a New Jersey statute prohibiting importation of solid or liquid waste
originating outside the territorial limits of the state violates the Commerce Clause);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 600 (1923) (holding a West Virginia act
that compelled retention within the state of all natural gas produced therein to
violate the Commerce Clause).
111. This kind of balancing is implicit in the Court’s test for Comity Clause
violations, which does not apply to all laws discriminating against non-residents, but
only to those that affect fundamental interests.  See infra notes 114-16 and
accompanying text (discussing the two-part test for evaluating violations of
fundamental rights).
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fundamental rights issues under the Equal Protection Clause do not
permit such analysis.112
Second, whether there is an individual right at stake may help
define the proper level of scrutiny for reviewing discriminatory
action.  For example, under the Comity Clause, the Court has
adopted a two-part test that is considerably less burdensome than the
approach it uses to evaluate violations of fundamental rights.113  In the
first step, the Court must determine whether the state rule involves a
privilege and immunity of state citizenship—-that is, whether it bears
upon the “vitality of the Nation as a single entity.”114  The Court must
then determine whether the differing treatment is justifiable—that is,
whether the “restriction is closely related to the advancement of a
substantial state interest.”115  Thus, where the first prong of the
analysis requires courts to weigh the norm of union-promotion to
assess fundamentality, which is not a requirement under
conventional individual rights analysis, the second prong only
requires that the relationship between the means and ends be
substantial, unlike the compelling interest requirement under
fundamental rights analysis.
In the context of the Commerce Clause, the standard only requires
that the discriminatory statute “serve a legitimate state purpose,”116
                                                 
112. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (commenting on the absence of
a federalism analysis relative to fundamental individual rights).
113. Under the fundamental rights analysis, the Court employs strict scrutiny in
which the state must show that the infringing action promotes a compelling state
interest.  See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (concluding that
Oklahoma failed to show a compelling state interest that would be sufficient to
override the equal protection concerns).
114. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
115. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 65 (1988) (citing Supreme
Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985)); see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 396-99 (1948) (holding a South Carolina shrimp fishing statute in violation of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause because there was no reasonable state purpose
for the discrimination against non-resident fishermen).  In Toomer, the Court
declared:
[The Privileges and Immunities Clause] does bar discrimination against
citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the
discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.
But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where
there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it.  Thus the inquiry in
each case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and
whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them.  The
inquiry must also, of course, be conducted with due regard for the principle
that the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in
prescribing appropriate cures.
Id. at 396 (citation omitted).
116. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (observing that part of the
general analysis articulated in precedent governing Commerce Clause questions is to
determine whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose).
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and that no non-discriminatory means to achieve the same end may
exist.117  As mentioned earlier, some commentators have criticized the
first prong of the Court’s Article IV jurisprudence, not because they
believed the clause solicitous of individual rights or interests, but
because they found that the Court’s analysis did not go far enough in
promoting federalist ideals.118
Third, if we assume that Congress can, by legislation, modify or
remove constitutional limits on state power stemming from federalist
concerns but not limitations affecting constitutionally protected
fundamental rights, then the Court’s interpretive power may be
limited depending on whether or not the constitutional limitation is
classified as a fundamental right.  This Article will examine these
implications in greater depth.
Other than the consequences listed above, deciding whether or not
certain anti-discriminatory principles are fundamental rights raises
thorny political theory issues.  For instance, what exactly is the
individual merchant’s role when he seeks to vindicate an anti-
discriminatory norm under the dormant Commerce Clause or the
Comity Clause?  Questions also arise regarding the recently arrived
migrant who faces discriminatory policies in the receipt of
government benefits and then sues the state under a “right to travel.”
In the Commerce Clause context, Professor Collins argues that such a
merchant acts, in effect, as a private attorney general, enforcing his
right not as an individual, but as a surrogate for the state.119  Professor
Collins’ loose classification, which I shall call “surrogate rights,” also
provides a fitting description of those other constitutional protections
derived from federalist promotion norms, such as the Comity Clause
and the “right to travel.”  Extending the analogy to these other
situations implies that, for example, when an individual sues under a
“right to travel,” he sues as a private enforcer of a norm designed to
promote federalism, not as a bearer of a fundamental right.  The
individual may suffer from the discriminatory rule, not as an
individual per se, but as an outsider—a resident of some other state
that is the intended beneficiary of the federalist norm.
Surrogate rights thus differ from fundamental individual rights in
that unlike the latter, the primary purpose is not to safeguard a
                                                 
117. See id. (stating that an additional part of Commerce Clause analysis is whether
“alternative means could promote [the] local purpose as well without discriminating
against interstate commerce”).
118. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (referencing critiques by Professors
Stimson and Varat).
119. See Collins, supra note 16, at 46 (noting that the Commerce Clause is
grounded in intergovernmental rights rather than in personal rights).
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sacred realm for individuals against state intrusion.  For a practical
definition, surrogate rights can be considered those interests asserted
by the individual against the state to protect values that are essential
to the existence of one union, as opposed to values that presume
there are certain liberties inherent to the individual upon which the
state may not infringe.120  Thus, the constitutional analysis relevant to
one principle may not be germane to the other.  In contrast, values
that promote the federalist goal of union cohesion may co-exist quite
comfortably with values that promote tyranny—an unlikely outcome
in the case of fundamental individual rights.121
In its analysis of “right to travel” cases, however, the Supreme Court
appears to blend the two approaches, often mixing and confounding
the norms protected under the surrogate rights principles with those
of individual fundamental rights.122  The result has been a jumbled
and incoherent jurisprudence over the proper constitutional
yardstick to measure the free movement doctrine, with
inconsistencies both in the constitutional values protected as well as
in the relevant standards of scrutiny.  When the Court cloaks the
“free movement doctrine” in the language of individual rights, there
often are other constitutional interests at stake-—interests that may
be particularly solicitous of the individual as such, but lack the
historical foundation to qualify as independent fundamental rights.
The next section of this Article examines the peculiar problems
that arise from the Court’s attempt to juxtapose what are often two
distinct constitutional values in its right to travel cases.  This Article
then suggests that a solution to this constitutional quagmire may be
to adjudicate right to travel cases under the same or similar standards
used under either the Comity Clause or the dormant Commerce
Clause.  This method would restore the “free movement doctrine” to
its proper constitutional place as a federalism-promoting norm.
                                                 
120. See Melanie Beth Oliveiro, Human Needs and Human Rights:  Which are More
Fundamental?, 40 EMORY L.J. 911, 920 (1991) (“[F]undamental rights presume an
obligation on the state not to infringe certain basic freedoms.  This creates a tension
between the state and its citizens.”).
121. For example, it is not difficult to imagine a political order with a
decentralized power structure that also has a regime that exercises arbitrary and
absolute power.
122. See infra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
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III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Of Fundamental Interests and Penalties
Many cases regarding the “free movement doctrine” suggest a
heritage that transcends federalism.  In Williams v. Fears,123 Chief
Justice Fuller identified this “right of locomotion” as “an attribute of
personal liberty . . . secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by
other provisions of the Constitution.”124  The Chief Justice’s
premonitions about the expansive scope of the doctrine proved not
to be fortuitous.  Barely forty years later, in his concurring opinion in
Edwards v. California,125 Justice Douglas referred to a “right of free
movement,”126 which he described as a principle of “mobility which is
basic to every guarantee of freedom of opportunity.”127  Subsequently,
the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson128 paved the way for the modern
principle’s lofty constitutional position when it declared
unequivocally that regardless of its origins, the right to travel was a
fundamental right.129
If the “right to travel” was really a fundamental right and an
“attribute of personal liberty,” it would be entitled to the same
protection as other similar fundamental rights, such as the freedom
of association, speech, and religion.  Equal in stature to those other
rights, it always would be subject to the strictest scrutiny with a
compelling means-end test of state interest.130  It would be subject to
these higher standards regardless of the nature of some other interest
affected by the discriminatory action.  That, however, has not been
the fate of the right to travel.  In evaluating whether there has been a
violation and whether strict scrutiny is warranted, the Supreme Court
                                                 
123. 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
124. Id. at 274.
125. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
126. See id. at 180 (Douglas, J., concurring) (observing that “free movement of
persons throughout this nation [is] a right of national citizenship”).
127. See id. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring).
128. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
129. See id. at 629-31 (construing the right to free movement from constitutional
concepts of personal liberty).
130. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (asserting that where certain
fundamental rights are involved, the Court has held that any regulations limiting
these rights are justified only by a compelling state interest); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634
(announcing that “any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [a]
right, unless shown to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (considering
whether a compelling state interest justifies the substantial infringement of
appellant’s right to religious freedom).
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has looked instead to other ancillary interests that may have affected
the right to travel—a position more consistent with Comity Clause
than with fundamental rights analysis.
Substantive due process and equal protection are the two
conventional doctrinal bases in the Fourteenth Amendment for
protecting fundamental rights.  The substantive due process variant
of fundamental rights protection targets the state’s interference with
an individual’s fundamental liberty interest, regardless of how others
are treated.131  Equal protection focuses on whether there is disparity
in treatment among a class of individuals on the basis of the exercise
of a fundamental right.132  Although the wisdom of having two
independent strands of fundamental rights protection has had its
share of controversy,133 it has, for better or worse, become a staple of
our modern constitutional jurisprudence.
In Shapiro, the Court chose to adopt the equal protection approach
for its analysis of the right to travel and held that any classification
that penalized the right to travel by discriminating among residents
based upon duration of residency would trigger the strict scrutiny
standard.134  In Dunn v. Blumstein,135 the Court clarified that the
penalty factor promoted in Shapiro would have to burden recent
migrants in a discriminatory fashion,136 and decided that whether the
                                                 
131. See Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (characterizing the due process
analysis as “emphasiz[ing] fairness between the state and the individual dealing with
the state, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated”).
132. See id. (describing the equal protection analysis as “emphasiz[ing] disparity in
treatment by a state between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably
indistinguishable”); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“When the law
lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of
offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination
as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.”); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding unlawful a municipal
ordinance making discriminations founded on the differences of race between
otherwise similarly situated persons).
133. Justice Harlan had such misgivings in the right to travel context:
[When] a classification is based upon the exercise of rights guaranteed
against state infringement by the Federal Constitution, then there is no need
for any resort to the Equal Protection Clause; in such instances, this Court
may properly and straightforwardly invalidate any undue burden upon those
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal
Protection:  A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1075 (1979)
(“The Court could have done exactly what it did in Shapiro by relying on the
constitutional right to interstate migration . . . without any reference whatsoever to
equal protection.”).
134. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 (stating that any classification that penalizes the
right to travel is unconstitutional unless it is necessary in promoting a compelling
state interest).
135. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
136. See id. at 342 n.12 (explaining that there is no equal protection problem
where an interstate migrant loses his driver’s license due to the state’s new higher
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durational residence requirement actually deterred travel was
irrelevant.137  Infused in this idea of a penalty would be all sorts of
jurisprudential baggage that would haunt any coherent development
of this right.
In a qualifying statement meant to clear up the scope of the right
to travel, the Court in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County138 declared
that “[a]lthough any durational residence requirement imposes a
potential cost on migration[,] some ‘waiting period[s] may not be
penalties.’”139  Therein lies the riddle of the modern right to travel.
For how does one distinguish between potentially costly but non-
qualifying penalties and real penalties?140  In response, the Court
delineated two categories of qualifying penalties:  (1) the deprivation
of fundamental political rights, and (2) the deprivation of “necessities
of life.”141  As to the first example, the Court previously had applied a
fundamental rights penalty test in Dunn v. Blumstein,142 in which the
Court invalidated as unconstitutional a state durational requirement
for voting.143  The necessities of life standard was applied in Shapiro
and Maricopa.144  The Court’s attempt to weigh the relevance of other
ancillary interests in determining whether there was a violation of the
right to travel had several important implications.
The first fundamental error in the Court’s penalty analysis in the
right to travel cases lies in its inexplicable shift toward connecting the
standard of review to the importance of some ancillary interest or to
the extent to which the fundamental right has been impinged.
Traditionally, fundamental rights cases did not require any such
analysis.145  As the Court held in San Antonio Independent School District
                                                 
age requirement because the requirement is imposed equally on all residents, new
and old).
137. See id. at 339 (announcing that “[i]t is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement
or denial of welfare is the more potent deterrent to travel”).
138. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
139. Id. at 258-59 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 n.21).
140. Justice Rehnquist raised this concern when he questioned the majority’s
reasoning in Maricopa County.  See 415 U.S. at 284 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  For
academic commentary critical of the Court’s penalty analysis, see generally Thomas
McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions—Fundamental Right to Travel or “Newcomers” as
a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 996-1023 (1975).
141. See Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 259 (discussing denial of life necessities
under penalty analysis).
142. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
143. See id. at 333.
144. See Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 259 (noting that Shapiro found denial of a
basic necessity of life).  On the other hand, the Court noted that a previous Supreme
Court case held that deprivation of in-state tuition rates from recent migrants did not
constitute a penalty because in-state tuition rates did not qualify as a necessity of life.
See id. at 259 n.12 (citing Vandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53 n.9 (1973)).
145. See Note, Durational Residence Requirements from Shapiro Through Sosna:  The
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v. Rodriguez,146 the “social importance [of the right] is not the critical
determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny.”147
Rather, the relevant question is whether the right is “explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”148  To the extent the Court
has tethered its right to travel analysis to some notion of penalty
before it applies strict scrutiny, the Court forces the relevant inquiry
to the nature and social importance of the benefit denied or harm
inflicted, rather than to the right to travel itself.  According to
Maricopa County, the penalty does not have to be any previously
recognized constitutional interest, and it does not have to actually
deter travel.149  Justice Rehnquist presciently observed that in
developing its penalty analysis, the Maricopa County majority resorted
to ipse dixit.150  In cases following Maricopa County, the Court employed
rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny review in analyzing
right to travel claims that had used durational residence
classifications.151  In Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez,152 a
plurality applied strict scrutiny to a civil service preference to
Vietnam veterans with residency at the time they entered military
service,153 but two concurring Justices would have applied rational
review to strike down the legislation.154  In her dissent, Justice
O’Connor chastised the plurality for rejecting rational basis review
without explaining why strict scrutiny was more appropriate.155  Justice
O’Connor also berated the concurring Justices for wanting to strike
down the law under rational basis review and then holding
incorrectly that a desire to reward citizens was not a legitimate state
                                                 
Right to Travel Takes a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 622, 624 n.14 (1975) (defining
“fundamental right” and setting out examples).
146. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
147. Id. at 32.
148. Id. at 33-34.
149. See Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 257-59; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 339 (1972) (stating that the Shapiro Court did not base its findings on whether
denial to welfare actually deterred travel).
150. See Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 285 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (accusing the
majority of declaring, rather than demonstrating, that the right at issue fell within
the protected class of rights).
151. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (employing rational basis review
in striking down a legislative scheme to distribute surplus oil revenues to citizens
based on duration of residency); Hooper v. Bernadillo County Assessor, 472 U.S.
612, 618 (1985) (applying rational basis review in striking down a limited property
tax exemption for Vietnam veterans with residency established prior to a certain
date).
152. 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (plurality opinion).
153. See id. at 904.
154. See id. at 912-13 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (asserting that the legislation
should be struck down based on its irrationality); id. at 916 (White, J., concurring)
(same).
155. See id. at 918-19 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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purpose.156  The inconsistency in standards of review applied by
members of the Court illustrates the unease that certain members
have with the idea of the fundamentality of the right to travel.  It also
demonstrates the confusion wrought by the Shapiro, Dunn, and
Maricopa County line of cases in using penalization analysis to
determine the relevant standard of scrutiny rather than referring to
the underlying fundamental right itself.
In due time, an expected twist in right to travel jurisprudence was
bound to occur.  This happened in Sosna v. Iowa.157  In Sosna, Justice
Rehnquist, a dissenter in Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County, wrote
the majority opinion.  At issue was an Iowa law requiring one year of
residency to file for divorce.158  Shunning the scrutiny set forth in the
Shapiro line of cases, Justice Rehnquist held that the plaintiff’s delay
in obtaining a divorce did not “irretrievably foreclose[] her from
obtaining some part of what she sought,”159 as was the case in Shapiro,
Dunn, and Maricopa County.  For this reason, Justice Rehnquist did
not apply the same scrutiny standards and penalty analysis as in the
Shapiro line of cases.160  More importantly, without specifying the
relevant standard of scrutiny, Justice Rehnquist held that the state’s
need to control and regulate domestic relations was sufficient to
justify the burdensome law.161  In dissent, Justice Marshall criticized
the majority’s analysis as an “ad hoc balancing test” that weighed the
importance of the state’s interest against the individual harm suffered
by the discriminatory legislation.162
Commentators have suggested that Sosna was an anomaly—a
mistaken and confusing departure from the Court’s right to travel
jurisprudence.163  In some ways, however, Sosna was in line with the
spirit, if not the literal word, of Shapiro and its progeny.  It is in part
the indeterminacy of what exactly constitutes a penalty that permits
                                                 
156. See id. at 919-20 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing Chief Justice Burger
for assuming that the state’s purpose is illegitimate).
157. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
158. See id. at 395 (citing a state law that required a person seeking a divorce to be
a resident for at least one year prior to filing for it).
159. Id. at 406.
160. See id. at 409.
161. See id. at 408-09 (holding that enacting residency requirements clearly falls
within a state’s domestic relations jurisdiction).
162. See id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing concern regarding the
consequences of the Court’s new approach to equal protection analysis).
163. See Todd Zubler, The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform:  Time for Shapiro v.
Thompson to Take a Hike, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 893, 904-05 (1997) (noting that the
Court established a new ad hoc balancing test in Sosna, but never applied the test to
any subsequent case involving the right to travel); Note, supra note 145, at 665-67
(expressing confusion about the Sosna Court’s departure from precedent in its
application of an ad hoc balancing test).
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courts to incorporate their own idiosyncratic values and engage in
the kind of ad hoc balancing test that Justice Marshall criticized.164
Thus, determining which activities qualify as protected “necessities of
life” may require such balancing especially when the Court has not
set out a clear baseline against which one can measure the
importance of the activity.  The state’s interest may be a relevant
factor in determining such a baseline.  For example, if a state has
wide latitude in dispensing a certain kind of benefit in any manner it
deems fit, it seems logical that denial of that benefit probably would
not infringe on some necessity of life.  To an extent, however,
examining how the state dispenses a benefit reveals something about
the state’s interest in administering the program.  This kind of
information, in turn, may be useful in assessing the fundamentality of
the activity.
The irony in most right to travel cases is that although some of the
relevant jurisprudence has been framed in terms of fundamental
rights, in practice it often comes closer to the analysis performed
under the Comity Clause.  For example, under traditional
fundamental rights analysis, the social importance of the right is
irrelevant in determining the level of scrutiny.165  All that is required
to invoke strict scrutiny is that the right be implicitly or explicitly
protected by the Constitution.166  Like the first prong of the analysis
under the Comity Clause, however, current right to travel analysis
requires some assessment of the fundamentality of the interest
affected before employing a higher level of scrutiny.167  Moreover, like
Comity Clause analysis, current right to travel analysis has been
subject to significant criticism for imposing a fundamentality
requirement.168
It is not just the treatment of fundamentality of interests that links
the modern jurisprudence of the two principles.  In practice, the way
some courts apply the compelling state interest requirement under
right to travel cases is more similar to the substantial interest test of
                                                 
164. In this context, the majority in Sosna may have considered the interest in
divorce not substantial enough to constitute a penalty on travel, a conclusion with
which Justice Marshall disagreed.  See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 419-20 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that denial of the right to obtain a divorce “clearly” meets the
standard of what constitutes a penalty on interstate travel).
165. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
167. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (declaring the state’s
interest fundamental before applying a strict scrutiny standard).
168. See, e.g., Note, supra note 145, at 668-69 (criticizing the Court’s use of “severity
of the penalty” analysis, which focuses on whether the benefit denied is fundamental
and the extent to which the restriction deters travel).
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the Comity Clause than it is to conventional compelling interest
analysis.169  For example, one lower court found that the state goal of
preserving a responsive government could withstand strict scrutiny,
even though it was not clear that the resulting burden on travel was
the least drastic means for achieving that end.170  In addition, the
Sosna Court appeared to adopt a less demanding level of scrutiny,
although it never said so explicitly.171
The same analogy applies when the Court employed rational basis
analysis in the right to travel cases.  In practice, the results have more
closely resembled the more exacting substantial interest test than
conventional rational basis analysis.172  Justice O’Connor was correct
in chastising the plurality in Soto-Lopez and the majority in Zobel for
examining the right to travel under the rational basis standard of
equal protection doctrine and then finding that a state’s interest in
compensating its citizens for past contributions fell short under those
standards.173  Justice O’Connor recognized that, although the
“principle of free movement” deserved more rigorous treatment than
would be available under rational basis analysis, it would be an error
to correct this doctrinal mistreatment by increasing the standards for
what constituted a legitimate state purpose.174  Thus, in Zobel, Justice
O’Connor surmised that the majority achieved the correct result but
                                                 
169. One court explicitly stated that intermediate scrutiny applies to the right to
intrastate travel.  See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 269-70 (3d Cir. 1990).
170. See Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (D.N.H. 1973) (upholding a
seven-year residency requirement for gubernatorial candidates and rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument that the requirement impinges on a candidate’s fundamental
right to interstate travel).
171. See Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1267 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992) (observing
that the standard applied by the Sosna Court more closely resembled rational basis
review than strict scrutiny).
172. Under the rational relationship test of equal protection, courts usually show
considerable deference to legislative judgment.  See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26 (1961).  As stated by the McGowan Court:
The constitutional safeguard [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State’s objective.  State legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their
laws result in some inequality.  A statutory discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts may be conceived to justify it.
Id.  But cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985)
(declaring that some state goals, such as a “desire to harm a politically unpopular
group, . . . are not legitimate state interests.”).  
173. See Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 919 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the plurality for utilizing an
unclear standard of equal protection review); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 73
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for assuming that the
state’s declared interest was “wholly illegitimate”).
174. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 76 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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used the wrong label.175  It was a change to the relevant doctrine that
was necessary, not a change of the standards under the wrong
doctrine.176
B. An Instrumental Right?
Other evidence of the right to travel’s questionable status as a
fundamental right is that it rarely, if ever, is invoked as a stand-alone
right or interest in the core cases dealing with interstate movement.
One commentator has gone so far as to describe the right to travel as
a mere “‘instrumental’ right . . . trigger[ing] the application of strict
scrutiny only when linked to the infringement of other fundamental
rights, such as voting.”177  Many right to travel cases arise in the
context of states’ efforts to protect their welfare budgets from
indigent migrants;178 thus, a recurring theme in those cases has been
the right of indigents to public assistance.  In some cases, it is difficult
to surmise whether the Court’s core constitutional concern is the
right to travel or the right to public benefits.179  In his dissent in
Dandridge v. Williams,180 Justice Marshall argued that Shapiro should be
read as holding that the right to welfare benefits was fundamental for
the purposes of strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis.181
Justice Marshall reasoned that when benefits are “necessary to sustain
life, stricter constitutional standards . . . are applied to the
deprivation of that benefit.”182  Justice Marshall’s perspective is
understandable given the Shapiro Court’s elevation of access to
                                                 
175. See id. at 71-81 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that the majority’s
decision should have been reached by examining the state legislation under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause).
176. See id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (advocating the use of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause rather than the doctrine of equal protection).
177. Note, supra note 145, at 671.
178. See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1521-30 (1999) (adjudicating a California
law denying welfare benefits to indigents); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250, 262 (1974) (rejecting Arizona’s asserted protection of the public fisc as a
valid reason to draw distinctions between classes of citizens); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 622-27 (1969) (striking down a statute that prohibited benefits to
residents of less than one year on grounds that it discriminated against the indigent);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941) (declaring as unconstitutional a state
statute that punished a person for bringing indigents into the state).
179. In Shapiro, Justice Harlan, in dissent, suggested that the majority was trying to
invent a right to public benefits when he stated:  “I must reiterate that I know of
nothing which entitles this Court to pick out particular human activities, characterize
them as ‘fundamental,’ and give them added protection under an unusually
stringent equal protection test.”  394 U.S. at 662 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
180. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
181. See id. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Shapiro as an example of a case
in which the Court required the state’s interest to be “compelling” because the state’s
legislation implicated a fundamental right).
182. Id. at 522 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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welfare benefits to a “fundamental” interest.  Indeed, some early
commentators on Shapiro viewed the case as establishing indigence as
some sort of suspect class under an equal protection analysis.183  In
view of the Court’s willingness to approve state residence
requirements in other contexts such as in-state tuition rates,184
divorce,185 and the right to vote in primary elections,186 the Court’s
lack of deference to the state on the issue of welfare payments makes
one wonder whether the right to travel is just a subterfuge in cases
where the Court is more concerned with the constitutional status of
the indigent.
The irony in the Court’s apparent solicitude for the indigent in the
context of the freedom to travel is that paupers or indigents
historically have been excluded from the doctrine’s protection.  The
power of local communities to exclude paupers from their territory
was a feature of the early common law that was embraced by the
colonies.187  Moreover, the Articles of Confederation—the historical
antecedent of the modern right to travel—specifically excepted
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from the privileges and immunities
of free citizens as well as from free travel.188  In New York v. Miln,189 an
1837 case, the Court upheld a New York statute requiring masters of
vessels arriving in New York to report the names of foreign
passengers (these included passengers from other states) so as to
“prevent them from becoming chargeable as paupers.”190  Observing
that New York had a unique problem with the heavy influx of foreign
immigrants, the Court declared it within the state’s police power to
protect its citizens from the evil of “being subjected to a heavy charge
in the maintenance of those who are poor.”191  In Edwards v.
                                                 
183. See Margaret K. Rosenheim, Shapiro v. Thompson:  “The Beggars are Coming to
Town,” 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 331-32 (arguing that earlier cases relied on standard
suspect criteria, including race, in analyzing equal protection claims, while the Court
in Shapiro focused on indigence in its equal protection inquiry).
184. See Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (upholding without opinion a
one-year residency requirement for in-state tuition).
185. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 395-96 (1975) (adjudicating durational
residency requirements related to filing for divorce).
186. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 753-62 (1973) (finding that a state’s
time limit to enroll for voting in primary elections was legitimate).
187. See Raoul Berger, Residence Requirements for Welfare and Voting:  A Post-Mortem,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 854-58 (1981).
188. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
189. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
190. Id. at 133.
191. Id. at 141 (noting that New York had more immigrants arriving than any
other city in the United States).  In the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (7 How.) (1849),
Justice Wayne, although agreeing that a state statute levying a tax upon aliens
arriving at its ports was an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce,
reasoned that the state still had the power to fence out paupers:
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California,192 the Court eventually rejected the idea endorsed by Miln
that a state could fence out poor people because they constituted a
“moral pestilence.”193  The Court observed that the problem of
indigence was now a national as well as local problem,194 and that it
did not feel bound by outdated thinking that appeared to connect
poverty with immorality.195  Any notion that Edwards and Shapiro
effectively had extended a special right of basic needs of life to the
poor, however, was obliterated by a line of cases starting with
Dandridge v. Williams.196
The vestiges of Shapiro remain, however, and the Court continues
to give heightened constitutional status to a range of human activities
it deems fundamental.197  In the context of free interstate movement,
the Court’s peculiar treatment of these “fundamental” human
activities that do not otherwise qualify as constitutionally protected
rights has led to a sort of quasi-rights regime.198  In some sense, the
                                                 
But I have said the States have the right to turn off paupers, vagabonds, and
fugitives from justice, and the States where slaves are have a constitutional
right to exclude all such as are, from a common ancestry and country, of the
same class of men. . . .  Paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives never have been
subjects of rightful national intercourse, or of commercial regulations,
except in the transportation of them to distant colonies to get rid of them, or
for punishment as convicts . . . .  The States may meet such persons upon
their arrival in port, and may put them under all proper restraints.  They
may prevent them from entering their territories, may carry them out or
drive them off.
Id. at 426 (Wayne, J., concurring).  In dissent, Justice Taney expressed similar
sentiments.  See id. at 466-67 (Taney, J., dissenting) (noting that states may prevent
people from entering if they are injurious to the state’s welfare); see also Missouri,
Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 629 (1898) (noting that a state may legislate
to exclude convicts, paupers, idiots, lunatics, persons likely to become a public
charge, and persons infected by contagious disease); Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155
U.S. 461, 478 (1894) (stating that states may exclude from their territories paupers,
convicts, persons likely to become a public charge, and persons afflicted with
contagious disease in order to promote the health, safety, and morals of citizens);
Hannibal & St. J. R.R. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877) (observing that states may
exclude convicts, paupers, idiots, lunatics, persons likely to become a public charge,
and persons afflicted with contagious disease).
192. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
193. Id. at 177 (finding that no one seriously would contend that an unemployed
or poor person was necessarily immoral).
194. See id. at 175 (illustrating that the relief of the needy has become the
common responsibility and concern of the whole nation).
195. See id. at 177 (“Poverty and immorality are not synonymous.”).
196. 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (holding that there is no right to receive welfare
benefits); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973)
(holding that a right to education is not guaranteed by the Constitution); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding no constitutional guarantee to access to
housing).
197. See Martha I. Morgan, Fundamental State Rights:  A New Basis for Strict Scrutiny in
Federal Equal Protection Review, 17 GA. L. REV. 77, 80-88 (1982) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s methods for determining fundamental rights)
198. See Gregory B. Hartch, Wrong Turns:  A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Right to
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values embedded in many of these interests do not separately rise to
constitutional magnitude, but they somehow do so when another
constitutionally protected interest is implicated—no matter how
remotely.199  Deciphering which interest is more pertinent is
confusing.  Thus, in denial of benefit cases, the Court often drifts
from arguments stressing the importance of free movement across
the country to arguments lamenting the state’s inhospitable
treatment of the poor.200  In Dunn, Maricopa County, and Sosna, for
example, there may have been scant, if any, evidence of deterrence to
actual travel itself,201 but the Court struck down the denial of benefits
as unconstitutional penalties on the exercise of the right to travel.202
In blending the sound doctrinal issues of one constitutional
interest with the strong factual predicates of another, the Court
somehow was able to make whole one constitutional violation.  Thus,
the claim of a right to travel provided a judicial vehicle for righting
the wrong of legislative apathy towards the poor by the states—a
judicial power that otherwise was limited by Dandridge.  Although this
instrumental value may be worthy enough, it complicates any
meaningful understanding of the contours of the right to travel.  So
far, as a personal right, such contours are blurry and ill-defined.
More promising would be to restore to the free movement principle
its original understanding as a limitation of interstate conflict as
expressed in the Articles of Confederation.203
                                                 
Travel Cases, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 458 (1995) (noting that “the right to
travel remains somewhat of an enigma—-an ill-defined right emanating loosely from
various penumbras within the Constitution”).
199. As previously mentioned, the penalty analysis under Shapiro and Maricopa
County does not require any meaningful deterrence to the individual’s ability to
travel.  See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
200. The Shapiro Court’s reasoning that any distinction between classes of
migrating indigents based on the amount of welfare payments sought was untenable
underscores the Court’s concern with poverty in that case.  See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969).  In Edwards, Justice Douglas observed that denial of
benefits to poor people would undermine national unity—a federalist goal, but he
also noted that it would “introduce a caste system utterly incompatible with our
system of government.”  Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
201. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  In Maricopa County, the Court
even noted that there was no evidence on the record that anyone was ever deterred
from travel by the restriction.  See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
257 (1974).  Dunn clarified that in Shapiro, the compelling state interest requirement
“did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel.” Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972).
202. See, e.g., Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 258 (noting that a classification that
operates to penalize those who have exercised their right to travel must be justified
by a compelling state interest).
203. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630-31 (suggesting that the right to travel emanates
from the very federal structure that the Constitution sought to create); accord
Katheryn D. Katz, More Equal than Others:  The Burger Court and the Newly Arrived State
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This Article has advanced the idea that the free movement
doctrine is purely a vestige of our federalist structure and not a
fundamental right.204  There is, of course, a middle ground between
these two positions—the doctrine could be both an attribute of our
federalist structure in addition to a fundamental personal right.205  If
there is a unifying theme to the Court’s right to travel jurisprudence,
it is probably that there is this duality of values embodied in this
“right.”206  Although the Court has latched on to the terminology of
personal rights in describing this principle, it never has advanced a
basis in our early constitutional history to support its analysis.207  As a
value antecedent to the Constitution and spelled out in the Articles
of Confederation, the free movement principle shares the same
origin with two other principles that embody purely federalist
values.208  In addition, there is no principled basis to segregate these
various doctrines from the underlying norm that binds them—the
promotion of a stronger federal union.209  Although the Court has
paid lip service to this federalist norm in all of its right to travel cases,
its personal rights analysis has all but obscured this norm from
attaining any meaningful constitutional importance.
                                                 
Resident, 19 N.M. L. REV. 329, 370 (1989) (noting that the primary values supporting
the unconstitutionality of legislation disadvantaging newer residents are those arising
from our federal structure).
204. But see Paul Ades, The Unconstitutionality of “Antihomeless” Laws:  Ordinances
Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 595, 606-08 (1989) (reviewing Supreme Court decisions and concluding that
the right to travel is a fundamental right grounded in either the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses).
205. See Durational Residency Requirements for Health Care for Indigents, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 112, 115-16 (1974) [hereinafter Durational Residency] (referring to the right to
travel as a fundamental right originating from federalist values).
206. Compare Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 901 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (describing the long-time recognition of the freedom to travel as
a basic right under the Constitution), with id. at 902 (noting the important role that
“the principle of free interstate migration . . . has played in transforming many States
into a single Nation”).
207. See Amber L. Cottle, Silent Citizens:  United States Territorial Residents and the
Right to Vote in Presidential Elections, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 332 (noting that the
right to travel remains elusive because the Supreme Court has not definitively
located the origin of the right); Karin Fromson Segall, It’s Not Black and White:
Spencer v. Casavilla and the Use of the Right of Intrastate Travel in Section 1985(3), 57
BROOK. L. REV. 473, 481 (1991) (observing that the Court has declined to find a
source for the right to travel).
208. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
209. Cf. Durational Residency, supra note 205, at 116-17 (describing state sovereignty
and the individual right to travel as “competing values”).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
Because state power to discriminate against non-residents or
recently arrived residents is in tension with the constitutional goals of
a cohesive federal union and an open economy, it seems obvious that
the objectives of interstate equality often may trump that of a state’s
particular interests.  By contrast, it is less clear why congressional
powers to limit interstate movement should be similarly restricted.
The current Court, however, views the free movement principle as an
inherent personal right that is able to be asserted against the states as
well as the federal government.  For example, in Saenz v. Roe,210 the
Court struck down California’s attempt to administer a durational
residence requirement for welfare benefits, despite the plan’s
authorization by Congress.211  Upon review, the Court held that
federal permission for states to implement durational residence
schemes was of no consequence because it had “consistently held that
Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.”212  In theory, the Court’s analysis is consistent with its
prior decisions that the right to travel is a right inherent to the
individual.  But when viewed as a limitation on interstate conflict, it is
illogical to construe the free movement principle also as a limitation
on the powers of the national government.
Both the Commerce Clause and the Comity Clause apply to state
and municipal decisions that attempt to discriminate against non-
residents or interstate commerce.213  The federal government is
appropriately exempt from these limitations because the norm
                                                 
210. 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
211. See id. at 1528-30.  In 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (Supp. III
1997), which replaced the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program with a program of block grants to the states called the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families.  Under this new program, welfare benefits devolved
from being a federal entitlement to being administered by the states.  See id.
§ 601(b).  As part of the program, Congress also allowed states to adopt durational
residence requirements in their various plans.  See id. § 604(c).
212. See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1528 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641
(1969)).  In Shapiro, the Court held that a federal statute that approved one-year
residency requirements in state welfare programs was invalid because Congress was
“without power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federal-state program by
legislation which authorize[d] the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641.
213. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978) (holding that
the Comity Clause prohibits discrimination against non-residents that burdens an
essential activity or the exercise of a basic right); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(9 How.) 299, 317-19 (1851) (stating that the Commerce Clause limits state
regulation of interstate commerce even when competing federal law exists).
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underlying these constitutional provisions is to restrict “state”
activities that are disruptive to our federal structure.  As previously
mentioned, the primary norm of the free movement principle is
essentially coextensive with those of these other two clauses.214  If the
federal government is exempt from the reach of such federalist
restraints on the states, should it not be able to allow the states to
adopt the limitations directly?
Professor Cohen has refined the argument made above that where
constitutional restrictions against state action stem solely from
distribution of power in the federal system, Congress should be able
to remove such restraints without offending the Court’s interpretive
powers.215  His thesis is simple:  if Congress is allowed to make certain
laws or pursue certain policies entrusted to it under the Constitution,
then it is unnecessary for the courts to protect that federal authority
from being delegated by the same body to which it is entrusted.216
Professor Cohen’s logic is supported by the inference that if Congress
can otherwise make the same policy choices reached by the states
directly, then it ought not matter if it delegates those powers to the
states.217  As Professor Cohen notes, any danger of excessive
delegation is mitigated by the improbability that Congress willingly
would give away the crux of its federal powers to the states.218
Furthermore, it is unlikely that any standard to check Congress
delegation of power would be coherent.219
The current jurisprudence of the Commerce Clause allows
Congress to make such delegations.220  In Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Benjamin,221 for example, the Court held that Congress’ power to
sanction discrimination by the states under the Commerce Clause was
virtually unlimited.222  Given the underlying thread that links the
                                                 
214. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
215. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws:  A
Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 388 (1983).
216. See id. (arguing that “Congress should be able to remove constitutional limits
on state power if those limits stem solely from divisions of power within the federal
system”).
217. See id. at 408-09.
218. See id. at 408 (stating that “Congress is unlikely to give away the store”).
219. See id. at 408-10 (concluding that identifying a viable standard for checking
excessive delegation is an insuperable task and impossible to apply).
220. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1982)
(“It is indeed well settled that Congress may use its powers under the Commerce
Clause to ‘[confer] upon the States an ability to restrict the flow of interstate
commerce.’”) (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980)).
221. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
222. The Supreme Court held that the plenary scope of the Commerce Clause
gave Congress the power:
[N]ot only to promote but also to prohibit interstate commerce . . . .  That
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Commerce Clause to the Comity Clause and free movement
principle, the analysis under these three doctrines should be similar.
Dissenting in Shapiro, Chief Justice Warren recognized this link when
he stated that “[t]he issue before us must therefore be framed in
terms of whether Congress may create minimal residence
requirements, not whether the States, acting alone, may do so.”223
Justice Warren approached the question in Shapiro in the same light
as the Edwards case:  as a possible Commerce Clause violation instead
of a violation of some kind of fundamental individual right.224  He
then concluded that Congress could mandate such residency
requirements on the basis of its power to control interstate
commerce.225  Again, although the free travel principle may not be a
mere extension of the Commerce Clause, the relationship between
the two sufficiently justifies Justice Warren’s approach.
Ironically, when faced with the same question, Professor Cohen
toyed with the idea that the right to interstate travel might fall under
the rubric of limitations that exist against both state and federal
intrusion alike.226  That outlook, however, was informed by the
Court’s prior precedent that the free interstate travel doctrine was a
“right” protected under the Equal Protection Clause.227  As argued
previously in this Article, that assumption is incorrect.
Understanding the free travel principle as just another limitation of
our federalist structure, there should be no basis for the separate
treatment of discrimination against interstate commerce and
discrimination against interstate travel.
Unfortunately, the perspective expounded upon by Professor
Cohen and being promoted here—that Congress ought to be able to
delegate to the states powers that it is not constitutionally restrained
from exercising itself—is not altogether consistent with Supreme
                                                 
power does not run down a one-way street or one of narrowly fixed
dimensions. . . .  This broad authority Congress may exercise alone, subject
to those limitations, or in conjunction with coordinated action by the states,
in which case limitations imposed for the preservation of their powers
become inoperative and only those designed to forbid action altogether by
any power or combination of powers in our governmental system remain
effective.
Id. at 434-35 (citations omitted).
223. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 608, 647-48 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
224. “Although the Court dismisses [the statute at issue] with the remark that
Congress cannot authorize the States to violate equal protection, I believe that the
dispositive issue is whether under its commerce power Congress can impose
residency requirements.”  Id. at 654 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 652 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
226. See Cohen, supra note 215, at 417 (noting the strong arguments that the right
of interstate travel is protected from both federal and state intrusion).
227. See id. at 417 & n.140.
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Court precedent.  In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,228 the Court held
that Congress delegation to the states of the power to set
compensation laws governing maritime injuries was invalid because
congressional power to set regulatory policy on maritime affairs was
exclusive, and the constitutional requirement for uniformity
mandated that such power could not be delegated to the states.229
The Court reached the same conclusion in Washington v. W.C. Dawson
& Co.230  Although Professor Cohen has dismissed these cases as
constitutional anomalies that were decided incorrectly,231 at least one
commentator has gone to great length to question the historical and
structural basis of Cohen’s thesis.232  According to this commentator,
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention never intended
Congress to have the power to approve discrimination by one state
against interstate trade or against the citizens of another state.233
Even if we assume that Congress is precluded from delegating some
of its policy-making authority to the states, surely it should be able to
legislate on its own welfare policies that discourage states from
becoming welfare magnets.  Not only does the federalist nature of the
freedom of travel endorse this position, it also makes good policy
sense.  For it is Congress, not the courts, that is better positioned to
weigh the trade-off between a compromise in certain federalist
restrictions against the states and a countervailing need to promote
other national policy goals, such as the disbursement of welfare
benefits.234  One commentator has suggested that the Court’s attempt
to weigh this balance on its own has been a disastrous experiment
that could lead to a race to the bottom among state welfare policies.235
The other implications of adopting a purely federalist
interpretation of the free movement principle have been discussed
                                                 
228. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
229. See id. at 164-65 (holding that the subject of maritime law was entrusted to
Congress and that delegating this power would disrupt the harmony and uniformity
that the Constitution intended to establish).
230. 264 U.S. 219 (1924).  The W.C. Dawson Court held that Congress cannot
delegate its power to alter, amend, or revise the maritime law.  See id. at 227.
231. See Cohen, supra note 215, at 405 (asserting that Congress has the power to
delegate to the states according to Prudential Insurance Co.).
232. See George Carpinello, State Protective Legislation and Nonresident Corporations:
The Privileges and Immunities Clause as a Treaty of Nondiscrimnation, 73 IOWA L. REV. 351,
358-59 (1988) (arguing that the Framers limited Congress’ commerce powers such
that only the Supreme Court could enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
233. See id. at 373-77.
234. But see id. at 375-77 (arguing that the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention vested the power of preventing state discrimination in the judicial
branch because they did not trust the task to the political will of Congress).
235. See Zubler, supra note 163, at 930-32 (explaining that federalism allows states
to race to the bottom regarding policies that deal with externalities, such as welfare).
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elsewhere in this Article.236  In sum, such an understanding would
bring the treatment of the standards of review under the right to
travel closer to those of other federalist limitations, such as the
substantial interest test of the Comity Clause.  This would reduce the
inconsistent standards that have marred the review of the “right to
travel” since Shapiro and bring those same standards closer to
vindicating the doctrine’s federalist values.  Returning the free
movement principle to its federalist origins also would clarify what
norm the principle is designed to protect:  the limitation of interstate
conflict through the promotion of a coherent federal union.  Various
members of the Court have attributed all kinds of norms to the “right
to travel,” ranging from free commerce to that of a special liberty
interest.  This confusing legacy stems from the Court’s reluctance to
ground the principle in any coherent constitutional framework.
CONCLUSION
The scope of the so-called “right to travel” depends on whether the
right is considered a fundamental right inherent to the individual or
a federalist restriction on the power of the states.  The Supreme
Court’s current jurisprudence is an unwieldy blend of federalist
principles and individual rights—a combination that does not find
support in the historical antecedents of the free movement doctrine.
As applied against the states, the free movement doctrine is not based
on individual rights, but on constitutional limitations that promote
federalism—limitations that are presumably inapplicable to the
federal government.  Other constitutional limitations that share a
common heritage with this doctrine include the Commerce Clause
and the Comity Clause of Article IV.  With barely any analysis,
however, the Court has held summarily that Congress is without
power to impose any such restrictions that may burden interstate
travel.  The Court’s treatment of the free movement doctrine as a
personal right has led to two other complications that continue to
haunt the doctrine’s development:  inconsistencies in the applicable
standard of scrutiny, as well as confusion as to the underlying
constitutional norm being protected.  To halt this confusion, the
Court should restore to the free movement principle its stature as a
constitutional limitation rooted in our federalist structure of
government.
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